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The Excess Sensitivity of Layoffs and Quits to Demand
ABS TRACT
Excessive layoffs in bad times and excessive quits in good times both
stem from the same weakness in practical employment arrangements: the
specific nature of worker—firm relations creates a situation of bilateral
monopoly. Institutions which have arisen to avert the associated inefficiency
cannot mimic the separation decisions of a perfect—information, first—best
allocation rule. Simple employment rules based on predetermined or indexed
wages are in many cases the most desirable among the class of feasible
employment arrangements. More complicated contracts which seem to deal
more effectively with turnover issues are either infeasible because of
informational requirements or create adverse incentives on some other
dimension.
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When demand falls, employers lay workers off. When conditions
are strong in the outside market, workers quit. Sometimes, the
workers who are laid off or quit produce less in their
subsequent jobs than they would have produced in their original
jobs. Such layoffs and quits are inefficient and undesirable.
Practical constraints on the nature of the agreement between
employer and worker bias the labor market toward these excessive
layoffs and quits. We argue that institutional arrangements
have arisen to eliminate costly bilateral monopoly situations.
A byproduct of those arrangements is too many layoffs when a
worker's value is lower than anticipated and too many quits when
a worker's value is higher than anticipated.
The idea is a simple one. When workers and firms agree to
trade they are uncertain about some aspects of the value of that
trade as well as the value of their alternatives. After that
knowledge is obtained, a bilateral monopoly situation arises
because the value of the match exceeds that of the next best
alternative. At that point, it is costly to decide how the rent
should be split. In anticipation of this difficulty, the terms
of the trade are agreed upon so that if trade occurs, it does so
according to the previously specified formula. The same problem
arises in many economic relations1; in this paper we discuss the
1See Dale Mortensen (1978) for a clear statement of the general
problem.—2—
way it seems to be handled in practice in the employment
relation.
When the terms of employment are set in advance, not every
contingency can be accommodated in a perfectly efficient manner.
As we will show, special provisions to bring efficiency on one
margin create incentives for distortions on another.2
A growing literature describes the inefficiencies resulting
from employment arrangements where the employer provides
insurance against income fluctuations.3 The inefficiencies,
often characterized as unemployment, arise because contracts
cannot simultaneously insure the worker against business cycle
risk and provide appropriate signals and incentives for
efficient separations.
We wish to deemphasize the insurance motive for three reasons.
First, risk-neutrality enormously simplifies the analysis. We
is the point of Edward Lazear (1981a). There, in order to
induce the worker to put forth sufficient effort, the earnings
relationship is distorted; severance pay and other institutions
arise to provide efficient allocation along all dimensions.
3The earliestpapers were Martin Baily (19714) and Costas
Azariadis (1975). Recent papers in this area are Costas
Azariadis (1980), Richard Arnott and Joseph Stiglitz (1981),
Russell Cooper (1981), Jerry Green (1981), Green and Charles
Kahn (1981), and Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart (1981a,
1981b).Azariadis (1979) provides a survey and many additional
citations. Some of the recent models generate underemployment
(Footnote continued)—3-.
can investigate a number of' incentive issues that would be
hopeless under risk aversion. Second, permanent—income theory
suggests that business—cycle fluctuations are only weakly
correlated with well—being, so insurance against the
fluctuations may not be of major importance. Third, most of the
variation in earnings is across workers, rather than over the
lifetime of individual workers. Though workers arevery
concerned about the risk associated with their unknown lifetime
potential to earn, this risk is uninsurable because of severe
moral hazard. Insured workers are too likely to reduce effort
below efficient levels.
Unlike most of the earlier work on labor contracts, we assume
from the start that information limitations are bilateral.5
Layoffs may occur when the employer learns of a disappointment
in demand which is not public knowledge and cannot be made a
3(continued)
while others generate overemployment. Only Cooper examines the
case of' bilateral asymmetric information, the subject of this
paper. What all these papers have in common is an emphasis on
the tradeoff between insurance and efficiency.
See Lee Lillard and Yoram Weiss(1979), Lillard and Robert
Willis (1978), and Robert Hall and Frederic Mishkin (1982).
Joseph Altonji and Orley Ashenfelter (1980) show that even with
past events treated as fixed effects, most personal wage
variation arises from transitions between jobs. The absence of
variation in individual earnings over time might possibly be
(Footnote continued)contingency in the employment arrangement. In parallel, quits
may occur when workers learn of favorable developments in the
outside market, again in a way that is not public knowledge and
not a contingency in their contracts. Because an important
fraction of all permanent job separations take the form of quits
(see Richard Freeman (I9XX)), an analysis with a claim to
describing the contemporary American labor market must allow
quits to play an active role. We also note that Information
limitations make the distinction between quits and layoffs
highly meaningful; our work departs from the position taken by
Gary Becker, Elisabeth Landes and Robert Michael (1977) that
separations always occur when they are to the mutual benefit of
the employer and the worker and the distinction between quits
and layoffs is meaningless.
We argue that simple arrangements involving predetermined
wages or unilateral wage determination are In widespread use
because they perform better in many respects than more
complicated contracts. Occasional inefficient separation is a
(continued)
attributable to insurance, we find this unlikely because
cross—sectional variation dominates time—series variation in
earnings among the self—employed as well.
5withrisk—neutralityand only a single dimension of' unobserved
shifts In demand, the contract problem has a simple, efficient
solution In which compensation is contingent on the level of'
employment chosen by the employer. See Robert Hall and David
Lilien (1979).—5—
byproduct of these simple contracts. Central to our approach is
the point that surplus quits and surplus layoffs have the same
origin: specification of the terms of trade before all the
relevant information is available and the inability to make the
terms of employment fully contingent on the information.
Of course, the claim that employment decisions tend to take
place with respect to a predetermined wage is hardly a novel
one. It is both the backbone of a large body of macroeconomic
thought and, usually less formally, permeates a good deal of
labor economics as well. But the theoretical foundations of
theories of employment fluctuations based on predetermined wages
have been questioned sharply, especially by the equilibrium
school (Robert Barro, 1977). We hope to respond to these
questions.
We proceed as follows: In section II, we argue that
contracts, or at least informal understandings about employment,
have an important role in the labor market. Section III
explores a simple model and compare three kinds of contracts.
We shows that no contract dominates the others; each type brings
inefficient separation in some circumstances. Consequently,
turnover rates are chronically too high. In section IV, we
examine the performance of the three simple contracts for cases
of firm—specific capital and positive correlation between demand
and supply surprises. Section V considers more unusual
contracts. Though some of them avoid inefficient separations,
their requirements for information make them infeasible.
Section VI considers some additional issues and conclusions arepresented in section VII.
—6——7—
II. Why have labor contracts at all?
Even with long-term employment and important specific capital,
employment contracts are not a logical necessity. A complete
theory of efficient job retention and separation is outlined in
footnote J4 of Becker, Landes, and Michael's paper on divorce
(1977). Let the firm and the worker bargain over compensation
and work, after the information about product is known to the
firm and information about alternative opportunities is known to
the worker. With specific capital, the bargaining problem is
not a zero—sum game, and its outcome cannot be predicted from
any widely-accepted theory of bargaining. Still, the parties
ought to come to an efficient conclusion, somewhere on the
contract curve. If they decide to separate when retention is
efficient, a further step in bargaining is possible that will
make both parties better off by taking advantage of the benefits
of continued employment. A similar step should prevent an
inefficient retention.
The simple period—by—period bargaining solution is widespread
in the labor market. Even when contracts exist, they can be
overruled by direct bargaining, and this sometimes happens when
developments occur that are totally out of the range
contemplated by the contract. But direct bargaining is an
enormously expensive process. Those without confidence in their
bargaining skills favor a well-defined employment arrangement
where bargaining is not part of the process of wage—8-.
determination.
As our subsequent discussion will show, the unilateral rights
of quit and layoff are an important intrinsic feature of labor
contracts; they are not artifacts of legal restrictions on the
enforcement of long-term contracts. When conditions in the firm
call for a reduction in labor input, a layoff' initiated by the
employer is very likely the right way to bring about the
efficient reallocation of labor. Similary, when the surprise
comes in the outside market for the worker's services, a quit is
the natural way to bring the efficient reallocation!—9—
III. Basic considerations and three simple contracts
Sometimes it is useful for employer and worker to agree upon
the terms of trade before all the relevant pieces of' information
become available. By the time the state of product demand and
conditions in the outside labor market become known, a good deal
of specific capital has developed in the employment relation.
As a consequence, postponement of' negotiations to the time when
the information is known creates a bargaining situation with
bilateral monopoly. Both parties gain privately from clever
strategic behavior. But this prisoners' dilemma can be
eliminated to the benefit of both parties by reducing the
employment terms to a formula which will be the subject of ready
agreement before the job—specific capital is formed.
In our model, a worker and firm come to an agreement in period
zero about the terms under which work will take place in period
one. No work occurs in period zero, but training and other
activities take place to form job—specific capital. To keep the
focus on the issue of' job separations, we assume that work is a
binary choice——either it occurs for a standard number of hours
in period one, or there is a separation and no work occurs.
Although we will consider more general arrangements in the next
section, most of' our points can be made by considering three
simple contracts:6
6Similar contracts are analyzed in MartL: Weitzman (1981), but
(Footnote continued)—10.-
Contract 1 (predetermined wage): A wage is agreed upon in
period zero and work occurs in period one at that wage unless
one side opts for no work through a layoff or quit.
Contract 2 (firm sets wage): The firm announces a unilateral
wage offer in period one and the worker chooses to work at that
wage or not at all.
Contract 3 (worker sets wage): The worker announces a wage
demand in period one and the firm chooses to employ the worker
at that wage or not at all.
For the reasons discussed in the introduction, we assume both
the firm and the worker are risk—neutral (risk aversion merely
reinforces the conclusions of this section). Denote the
worker's marginal product at the firm by M and the value of the
alternative use of the worker's time (at another firm or at
home) by A.The worker privately observes A and the firm
privately observes Mat the start of period one. Information is
bilaterally asymmetric.
We take as the best contract the one maximizing the sum of
expected values to both parties. We allow a lump-sum,
nonallocative payment from one party to the other to achieve a
mutually satisfactory distribution of the benefits of the
6
(continued)
he does not consider a no—trade clause in the contract with
predetermined price. The role of no—trade provisions is the
essence of our discussion. Weitzman also lets the quantity
traded be a continuous variable.—11—
bargain. Maximizing the sum of expected values is equivalent to
maximization of profit subject to a minimum expected utility for
the worker and equivalent to maximization of utility subject to
a minimum profit for the firm. If X is a random variable equal
to one if work occurs and zero if' not, the goal is to maximize
(1) E(XM +(1-X)A)
Contracts attempt to make X1 when H is large and XO when A is
large; that is, to have work take place when productivity in the
firm is favorable and to have a separation when the outside
market is favorable. The first—best contract sets X=1 when M
exceeds A and XO otherwise. Other contracts will be judged
against this basic efficiency criterion that work should occur
when and only when the worker has a comparative advantage in the
firm (M>A).
In general, contracts provide for a certain amount of'
compensation to be paid at the outset and then specify
additional compensation after information becomes available in
period one. The initial compensation is effectively a lump sum
and has no role In determining whether employment occurs; it is
available to offset any distributional effects the later
provisions may have. In a contract of' type 1, a payment, S,
flows from the firm to the worker at the outset and then a fixed
wage, W, is paid if' work takes place in period one. After the
contract is signed, the relevant marginal payment Is W so all—12—
decisions depend only upon it.
In contract 1, employment is determined in the following way:
The firm learns M at the beginning of period one. It lays the
worker off if M is less than W. The worker learns A at the same
time and quits if A exceeds W.Of the four possible outcomes,
work occurs in only one, when there is neither a layoff nor a
quit. The operation of the contract is displayed in figure 1,
which borrows from Masanori Hashimoto and Ben Yu (1980) and
Lorne Carmichael (1981).Whenever the realization of (M,A)
lies below the 5-degree line in figure 1, it is efficient for
work to occur. But the firm will lay the worker off in the
whole region to the left of the vertical line MW, and the
worker will quit in the whole region above the horizontal line
A:W. The two shaded triangles describe the potential
inefficiencies from the predetermined wage contract.
In the lower left triangle, an inefficient layoff occurs.
Conditions are poor in the firm UI is low), but even worse in
the outside market (A is even lower). Though the worker has a
comparative advantage in the job, the contract fails to make the
employer take that comparative advantage into account. In the
upper right shaded triangle, conditions are good in the outside
market (A is high), but are even better in the firm (N is even
higher). Again, the worker has a comparative advantage in the
current job, but in this case, the contract fails to provide the
worker the appropriate incentives to remain and a quit occurs.
Users of contract 1 will choose W in advance to maximize the
joint return as given in equation 1, subject to a distributionW
-12a-
Figure 1. Outcomes under the fixed-wage contract
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of X in which it has value one only if'Ais less than W and M is
greater than W.
Contracts of types 2 and 3 try to make use of information that
becomes available in period one. In contract 2, the firm
observes H before calling out the wage offer and in contract 3,
the worker observes A before calling out the wage demand. These
procedures add some flexibility which may reduce the loss from
inefficient separation. But the gains are countered by the
inefficiencies brought by the exercise of monopoly power by the
party who is responsible for setting the wage. The private
benefit considered as a function of the wage set at the
beginning of period one looks quite different from the joint
benefit, so efficient wage—employment behavior is impossible in
contracts 2 and 3. Still, the added responsiveness of contracts
2 and 3 can make them superior to the fixed—wage contract 1 in
some circumstances.
Consider contract 2. The non—contingent payment, S, is agreed
upon in advance and the firm is free to choose W after having
observed H. Both the worker and the firm recongize that the
firm will ignore the benefits from the match which do not accrue
to the firm. Even so, there may be a value of S such that both
the firm and the worker are better off under contract 2 than any
other feasible contract.
Thefirm selects the wage in period 1 after observing H so as
tomaximize
E [X(W)(M —W))where X(W) is the stochastic labor supply schedule of the
worker; X(W) 1 if W is not lower than A and is 0 otherwise.
For expositional simplicity, we will assume for the moment that
M and A are independent, so we can write the cumulative
distribution function of A as G(A), the probability that the
value of outside opportunities is no greater than A. Because M
andW are non—random from the point of view of the firm in
period 1 ,theexpected profit is just
G(W)(M-W)
Expectedprofit reaches its maximum when
WM —G(W)/g(W)
We conclude that the firm will always call out a wage which is
less than the worker's marginal product. The depressed wage
offer creates the possibility of a quit when the firm would have
been willing to offer the worker a wage sufficient to attract
him to remain on the job. As a monopsonist (ex post), the firm
shades the wage downward because there are many potential values
of A which lie below the observed M and the firm reaps profit in
these cases by offering the worker a wage less than his full
value to the firm.
Contract 3 is similar. Here the worker is given the power
unilaterally to set a wage demand in period one. Both the firm—15—
and worker know that the worker will be act as a monopolist in
period one, but the added flexibility may make this arrangement
superior. The worker chooses the wage by maximizing
E [X(W)W +(1-X(W))A]
after he learns A.Now the first—order condition for maximum
expected earnings is
W A +(1—F(W))/f(W)
where f(M) is the density of M and F(M) is its cumulative
distribution. As a monopolist, the worker always sets a wage
above the value of the alternative use of time even though this
will sometimes result in inefficient separation.
As one might expect, the choice between contracts 1, 2, and 3
depends upon the joint distribution of' M and A. No single
contract type is superior under all circumstances. We prove
this by counterexample shortly. But the choice of' contract type
is not the main focus of our work. Rather, we want to say
something about the relationship between demand fluctuations and
job separations. We now have the necessary machinery to
proceed.
To provide a feel for the forces at work here, we analyze a
special case. Assume that M and A are independently and
uniformly distributed between zero and one. Then the analysis
earlier in this section shows that the best predetermined wage—16-.
is W1/2 and the expected loss from inefficient quits is 1/214.
Under contract 2, the wage policy maximizing expected profit for
firms is W =M/2,because g=1 and G(W)=W. The loss from
inefficient separtions is the are of triangle ABC in figure 2,
calculated as
E EX*(M,A) -X(M,A)][M-A] ;
here X'(M,A) is the first—best employment rule: X'=l if A is no
greater than H and zero otherwise; and X(M,A) is the employment
rule when the employer sets the wage: X=1 if A is no greater
than M/2 and zero otherwise. The expected loss is also 1/214.
Under contract 3 where the worker makes a wage demand after
learning A, the best policy is to ask for WA/2 +1/2,because
f=1 and F(W)=W. The expected loss from inefficient layoffs is
the area of triangle ABD in figure 2 and is computed from the
expression just given with X(M,A) 1 if' H is not less than
A/2+1/2 and zero otherwise. Again, the expected loss is 1/214.
In all three contracts, the value of the lump—sum component of
compensation, S, can be set to provide the appropriate
distribution of expected profit and earnings to the two parties.
In this example, the three contracts yield identical joint
expected losses and are equivalent in that sense even though
they are very different in actual outcome and in the
interpretation given by the two parties to events. In the
predetermined wage contract, there are both quits and layoffs.
In the firm—sets—wage contract, there are only quits.In the1
450
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Figure 2. Outcomes under firm-sets-wage and worker-sets-wage contracts
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worker—sets—wagecontract, there are only layoffs. No one
contract is preferred to another without bringing in other
considerations. We shall examine other criteria for contract
choice in a later section, but before doing so, we state our
main point:
Too many quits occur when conditions in the market are good
but conditions in the firm are even better. Too many layoffs
occur when conditions are poor in the firm but even worse in the
market. "Too manyt' or "inefficient" are defined relative to the
perfect information, first—best optimum.
First, consider the predetermined wage contract illustrated in
figure 1.In our example, the optimal predetermined wage is
W=1/2. When demand is relatively weak (M is below 1/2), the
worker is laid off. Sometimes, these layoffs are efficient
(whenever M<A). At other times, it would be in the joint
interest of thetwo parties to retain the match because the
value ofthe worker's alternative use of time is below his value
to the firm, even though that value lies below the wage rate.
If worker and firm could renegotiate the terms of trade, work
would take place. But it is exactly the costly renegotiation
that the fixed wage contract sought to avoid. The price paid is
an occasional inefficient layoff. The reverse is true during
good periods for the firm, when H exceeds 1/2. The firm never
lays the worker off, bu the worker will quit whenever A exceeds
1/2. In the upper shaded region in figure 1, the worker quits
when staying on the job would have been mutually beneficial.
Thus, workers quit too frequently when conditions are favorable—18-.
and firms lay workers off too frequently when they are
unfavorable. Employment is excessively sensitive to
fluctuations in demand.
In this simplest case, it is interesting to note that a given
layoff is more likely to be inefficient when H is only a little
below the wage, W. Because the layoff decision is insensitive
to the value of A, the higher is H the more likely it is to
exceed A.
Next, consider contract 2 where the firm makes a wage offer
after having observed M. There can be no layoffs with this
contract, but inefficient quits are correspondingly more likely.
With reference to figure 2, it is clear that a worker opts to
quit whenever A exceeds W, that is, everywhere above the line AC
in figure 2.A worker is almost certain to quit when H and
therefore Ware low. Further, since H is low, most quits are
efficient in that the worker's alternatives exceed his value to
the firm. For higher H, however, the probability of a quit is
lower (the probability is one at MO and 1/2 at M=1). But the
incidence of inefficient quits is higher for higher values of N.
The triangle of inefficient quits, ABC in figure 2, becomes
taller on the right; that is, E(M—A)X is an increasing function
of H. Inefficient quits are more likely to occur when the firm
experiences good times relative to the rest of the market even
though the number of quits actually falls during these periods.
Theinefficiency stems from the firm's extraction of monopsony
rents from workers by setting the wage below H.
Finally,consider contract 3wherethe worker makes a wage—19—
demand after observing A. Quits do not occur, but layoffs are
correspondingly more of a problem. The wage demand always
exceeds 1/2, so a layoff is certain if 14 is below 1/2. Here, as
in the fixed wage case, layoffs which occur when M is just below
1/2 are more likely to be inefficient that those which occur
when N is well below 1/2 because the probability that A exceeds
H rises as M falls. For values of H above 1/2, the closer N is
to one, the lower is the probability of a layoff and the lower
is the probability of an inefficient layoff.
To summarize this section, inefficient layoffs occur when the
value of the worker to the firm is low, but the worker's
alternative opportunities in the outside labor market are even
weaker. With a predetermined wage, the firm reacts only to the
relationship between the wage and the internal value of the
worker and cannot moderate layoffs when opportunities are poor
in the outside market. Letting the worker set the wage does not
reduce the incidence of inefficient layoffs in bad times by
lowering the wage--on the contrary, the worker may be so
aggressive in exerting monopoly power as to set a wage that
guaranteeslayoff whenever demand facing the firm is below
average, no matter what is happening in the labor market.
Similarly, inefficient quits are frequent because the worker
reacts only to the relationship between the wage and the
alternativesin the labor market. With a fixed wage, the worker
rationally ignores the possibility that things are good
elsewhere, but even better at the firm. Again, letting the firm
set the wage might help solve this problem, but in our example,—20-
the firm exploits its monopsony power so aggressively that it
never offers a wage high enough to forestall an inefficient
quit.
The shortcomings of the three simple contracts considered in
this section suggests there is a role for richer types of
contracts. Later in the paper, we consider a wider set, but we
conclude that no practical contract solves all problems
effectively. Excess sensitivity of separations to demand seems
an inescapable feature of the labor market.—21—
IV. More on the three simple contracts
In the example of the previous section, all three contracts
had the same expected joint loss from inefficient separation.
Our choice of a joint distribution for M and A explains this
coincidental tie. In this section, we show how the
characteristics of the joint distribution favor one contract
over another. We look at the case of a mean of M well above the
mean of A, which might arise because specific capital gives the
worker a strong comparative advantage in the current job. We
also examine the case of positive correlation between N and A,a
likely case for business cycle applications.
In discussing the issue of comparative advantage, we will
retain our assumption of independence of N and A. Suppose, in
our earlier example, that the worker obtains one unit of
firm—specific human capital in period zero so that the
distribution of H in period one is uniform between 1 and 2.At
the same time, nothing happens to the distribution of A, because
the investment improves the worker's productivity at the current
firm only. The situation is illustrated in figure 3. The best
fixed—wage contract sets W:1 so that neither quits nor layoffs
ever occur. Because N always exceeds A, separations are never
efficient and the fixed—wage contract is first—best. Contract 2
still makes firms offer a wage of M/2, which brings inefficient
quits when (N,A) realizations fall in the triangle ABC.
Contract 3 makes workers demand a wage of A/2 +1,which brings—22—
inefficient layoffs when the (M,A) realizations lie in triangle
DEE. Obviously the fixed—wage contract is superior to either of
the alternatives. Specific capital makes it more likely that
work should occur. A contract with a fixed wage, above most of
the alternatives but below the likely marginal product at the
firm, will give close to the efficient pattern of separations.
As a general matter, we conclude that specific capital and other
conditions leading to strong comparative advantage to the worker
in the current job favor the fixed-wage contract over the two
variable—wage contracts.
This reasoning has implications for variability in wages and
separations over the life cycle. Young workers have less
specific capital, so they are less likely to have a fixed—wage
contract. Accordingly, compared to their older colleagues,
their wages and employment should vary more over the business
cycle. We cannot make any similar statements about variations
in wages across workers because there is so much heterogeneity,
which varies with age
Positivecorrelation between M and A works in the opposite
direction, improving the efficiency of the flexible wage
contracts relative to the predetermined wage contract. To see
this, consider the case ofperfectcorrelation between HandA.
Whenthe firm learns its H, it also learns A.It faces a labor
supply function that isperfectlyelastic at the wage A, soit
has no monopsony power and simply offers A when A does not
exceed H. Inefficient separation neveroccurs.7—23—
V. Other contracts and other criteria
We have restricted our attention to three types of' wage
arrangements because we believe that these are the most
prevalent contract types. We have also cast most ofthe
discussion in terms of separation efficiency and have ignored
other efficiency criteria by which one may evaluate contracts.
In this section, we briefly consider a wider class of contracts
and a number of criteria by which to choose among them.
In this wider class, the employer makes a wage offer, W0,
after learning N, and the worker makes a wage demand, WD, after
learning A. Two mediation formulas translate the offer and the
demand into a wage paid, W, and a wage received,WR:
5= Wp(Wo,WD)
5WR(Wo,WD)
In addition, there is a lump—sum payment, S. We investigate the
features of arrangements where wages received are not
necessarily the same as wages paid, and a third party makes up
the difference. Though such arrangements have some very
desirable properties, we conclude that the involvement of third
parties is impractical.
7Weitzman (1981) presents an analogous result._2l4.
Inthe wider class of contracts, severance pay may be part of
the compensation plan, and the amount of severance pay may be
one amount, Q, if the worker quits, and a different amount, L,
if the employer lays the worker off. An even more general
contract would permit the L and Q received to differ from the L
and Q paid, as investigated by Carmichael (1981), but we do not
pursue that generalization.
We evaluate the members of the wider class by the following
criteria:
1. Information feasibility and efficiency: The parties have
the necessary information, resources, and the appropriate
incentives to carry out the terms of the contract. The contract
does not create incentives to expend resources generating false
information.
2. Separation efficiency: Work occurs when, and only when, A
Is not greater than M. This was the single criterion considered
in the earlier sections.
We also note there is an issue of investment efficiency.
Efficient investment in job search and general and specific
human capital occurs if and only if the joint return to the
worker and firm exceeds the joint costs. But none of the
contracts we consider satisfies investment efficiency. Because
investment issues are a complex topic by themselves, we defer
discussion to a later paper.
We can summarize our findings about the three simple contracts—25—
with respect to these two criteria in the following compact way:
All three are feasible and efficient in their treatment of
information, but none provides separation efficiency. Now we
will turn to contracts that promise separation efficiency but
are impractical from the point of view of information.
(i) Piece rates
First is a piece rate contract. The firm pays the worker M and
the worker decides whether to work for the firm or not. In our
notation, WpWR and L =Q0. By rewarding the worker fully
for what he produces for the firm, the worker is made to
internalize the separation decision, and this contract brings
full separation efficiency. But the piece rate contract is not
feasible from the point of view of information. The worker
cannot verify that the rate of pay actually equals his
productivity. Only firms know M, but they have no incentive to
reveal it truthfully. Further, firms face an incentive to
devote costly resources to concealing or falsifying information
about M.If the worker simply accepts the firm's announcement
of M without any verification, the purported piece—rate contract
is exactly the same as the firm—sets—wage contract studied
earlier in the paper, where separation efficiency fails.
(ii) Market wage-26—
A related contract pays the worker the market wage, that is,
WRA and L =Q0 (with S chosen as usual to distribute
the rents). Now the problem is the firm's inability to verify
the worker's claim about the opportunities in the outside labor
market, A. The worker faces incentives to produce evidence of
highly favorable outside conditions, an activity which is either
costly or effectively converts the contract into the
worker—sets—wage form. Either way, efficiency fails.
(iii) The expectations principle
A third type of contract amounts to treating an employment
contract a:; an ordinary commercial contract under the common
law.It has the same provisions as the predetermined—wage
contract treated earlier, but instead of walking away from the
employment relationship without further financial consequences,
the party that dissolves the relationship must compensate the
other for losses inflicted. Under the common law, the departing
party must compensate the other by the amount of the expected
gain evaluated at the time the departure (or breach) occurs.
Let W be the agreed wage. If the firm lays the worker off, it
must compensate the worker for the difference between the
contract wage, W, and the actual value of the worker's time, A:
L=W-A
A quitting worker must compensate the firm for the difference—27—
between marginal product and contract wage:
Q -CM -W)
recall that Q is a payment from firm to worker, so it is
negative in this case. Again, there is a lump-sum payment, S,
to distribute rents without any allocational consequences.
A familiar result from the economic theory of contracts
establishes separation efficiency for this contract.8 The firm
makes its layoff decision by comparing profit from employment, M
—Wto profit with a layoff, -L—(W —A).The firm will
choose employment if and only if M —Wis not less than —w +A,
that is, if and only if M is not less than A, our original
efficiency condition. Similarly, the worker compares earnings
on the job, W, to earnings in the case of quit, A -CM-W).
Again, the worker chooses to quit if and only if A exceeds M, as
required for separation efficiency.
Under the expectations principle, there are situations when
the worker wants to quit and the firm simultaneously wants to
lay the worker off. Any point in the northwest quadrant of
figure 1 has this character. The firm stands to gain if the
resulting separation is labeled a layoff rather than a
quit——profit from a layoff is —(W -A),whereas profit from a
quit is M -W,which is smaller because M is less than A.
Similar logic shows that the worker prefers that a separation be
8See Steven Shavell (1980) andA. Mitchell Polinsky (1981).-.28—
labeled a quit. The two parties may spend resources trying to
be the first to bring about a separation. But this problem
exists with every commercial contract and does not seem to be a
major difficulty.
Although the expectations principle brings separation
efficiency, it does not satisfy our requirements with respect to
information. The firm does not know how large a payment it.will
be obligated to make to the worker in the event of a layoff, so
it will not make an efficient decision, in general. The same
holds for the worker. Each party faces an incentive for costly
research to acquire the other side's information. Further,
because compensation is effectively contingent upon the values
of A and M, each side has an incentive to expend resources to
make the apparent values of A and 11 differ from the actual
values. Finally, the expectations principle sets up the wrong
incentives for investment in period zero, an issue known in the
legal literature as reliance. Again, the complexity of
investment issues prevents us from pursuing the question in this
paper.
(iv) Offer-matching
A closely related contract involves offer—matching.9 Again, a
wage is set in advance, and a lump—sum payment, S, distributes
rents, but actual compensation is raised if A exceeds the wage.
9See Mortensen (1978) and Peter Diamond and Eric Maskin (1979).—29—
The worker has an incentive to bring concrete evidence to the
firm about the value of A in the form of a job offer. If A
exceeds W but still falls short of M, the firm raises the wage
to A.If' A exceeds M, the worker quits, efficiently. One—sided
offer matching of this kind eliminates inefficient quits, but
does not limit inefficient layoffs.
To prevent inefficient layoffs, when M falls below W but
exceeds A, a more dubious form of offer—matching is required, in
which the worker agrees to accept the lower wage when the firm
produces an offer from a worker to work at the lower wage.
Overhwelinlng informational obstacles limit this procedure.If' a
single offer to work at lower wages is enough to permit cutting
the wages of a number of existing workers, the firm has an
incentive to make a side arrangement with somebody to make a
fraudulent offer. At the extreme, workers are powerless to
verify purported offers from others to work at lower wages.
Then the offer—matching contract becomes the firm-sets-wage
contract. Furthermore, the evaluation of offers becomes
impractical when non-wage dimensions of jobs are important.
Lastly, verification that offers are genuine on either side is
costly and difficult.
Still, one—sided matching of offers received by workers is an
importantfeatureof the labor market, and probably makes a
contributionto reduction of inefficient quits. Offer—matching
does not stimulate excess investment in job search. A worker
searches if the expected return from search, A -W,exceeds the
cost.Offer—matching does not change that. Ifthe firm does—30—
not match the offer, the worker leaves and receives A.If the
firm does match the offer, the worker stays and receives A.
Costs and returns to the worker are the same. But
offer—matching does encourage fraud, and the efficient
employment arrangement may prohibit responding to offers in
order to eliminate investment in phoney offers. Under
offer—matching, a worker may arrange with a third party for a
fraudulent offer and split the resulting wage increase. Even if
an outside offer is genuine, the worker may engage in a costly
and potentially inefficient game of presenting the offer to his
employer for matching even though he would rather stay on the
current job at the current rate of pay. Non—pecuniary
dimensions of jobs are difficult for the employer to verify.
Cv) The bilateral Vickrey contract
This contract applies William Vickrey's (1961) auction
principle to both sides of the employment arrangement.° The
bilateral Vickrey contract involves a third party because wages
paid always fall short of wages received. The employer makes a
wage offer and the worker makes a wage demand; each acts at the
same moment, without knowing what the other has announced. If
the offer is at least as good as the demand, employment occurs,
10joseph Stiglitz assures us that this application ofVickrey's
idea is "well known in the principal—agent literature," but we
have not found a written discussion.—31—
butthe employer pays the demanded wage while the worker
receives the offered wage. In our notation,
WRW0 and W,
WD. In addition, the employer and the worker pay the third
party an amount equal to the expected value of —W(with the
convention that 5- WR0 when a separation occurs), and S is
paid by the worker to the firm as a lump sum.
In this setup, the incentives induce the employer to set its
wage offer equal to the marginal product, M, and also induce the
worker to set the wage demand equal to the value of the
alternative use of time, A.From the employer's point of view,
the wage offer has no influence on the wage cost of the worker;
it only controls whether employment occurs. A wage offer above
M would create the possibility of employment at awage in excess
of M, and results in a loss with no compensating gain in other
states. A wage offer below M does not save the firm anymoney;
itdeprives the firm of the possibility of profitable employment
whenthe worker's wage demand is below M. Consequently, the
firm always sets its wage offer to M. Similar logic shows that
the worker always demands A.Work occurs if and only if M does
not fall short of A, exactly the condition for efficiency.
The role of the third party in the bilateral Vickrey contract
creates serious problemsand ispresumably the reason that such
contracts are never found in practice. Collaboration between
the worker and employer can victimize the third party, so the
supply of willing third parties is limited. Worker and employer
maximize joint benefits by making very high wage offers andvery
low wage demands. In this respect, the incentives to reveal the—32—
true H and A in the bilateral Vickrey contract are an illusion.
The third party would have to try to verify H and A, which is
costly in itself and creates incentives for the firm and worker
to expend resources establishing false values of M and A.
(vi) Coordinated severance pay
In the firm—sets—wage contract studied early in the paper, the
firm always sets a wage that is too low, because of the firm's
rnonopsony power. If the contract embodies a wage subsidy, the
firm can be induced to set the right wage and bring efficient
separations through quits. Whether such a scheme can bring
exact efficiency depends on the information available at the
time the wage decision is made relative to the information
available at the time the contract is signed.In the extreme
case where the firm learns nothing about the likely value of A
after contract signing, the analysis of d'Aspremont and
Gerard—Varet (1979) can be applied to this problem.11 Let Y be
the increment to compensation associated with working, so
compensation in the case of work is WY +Q,and let the
contract embody a formula, Q(Y), which assigns a level of quit
pay given the firm's decision about Y. The parties maximize
joint benefits by choosing a Q(Y) that brings efficient quits by
exactly offsetting the monopsony influence that otherwise tends
We thank Oliver Hart for suggesting this line ofattack and
for pointing out the reference.—33—
tomake Y too low and causes excess quits.
When Q(Y) is properly chosen, the firm's profit-maximizing Y
will be exactly its M—-when efficient separations are achieved
entirely through quits, the extra compensation for working, Y,
must equal the worker's marginal product, M. The right Q(Y)
will make the firm spontaneously reveal the true value of M.12
When the time comes to choose Y, the firm will try to maximize
expected profit,
E [(M —Y—Q(Y))X—Q(Y)(1—X)]
As before, X has the value 1 if work occurs and 0 for a quit.
If'G(A)is the cumulative distribution of A, then the
probability that work occurs when the firm announces an
incremental wage of '1 is G(Y), and expected profit is
(M —Y)G(Y)-Q(Y)
Profit reaches its maximum at
kind of'contractis a variant of a Groves (1973)
mechanism for inducing truthful revelation. Most discussions
have one party announce the value of a variable and let the
contracttranslate the announced value into a price. In the
labor market, its seems to us more natural for the firm to
announce a wage directly. Analytically, the two procedures are
identical.—34—
I M —(G(Y)+Q(Y))/g(Y)
this is just our earlier expression for the firm—sets—wage case
with the subsidy term, —Q'(Y)/g(Y), added. In the special case
where G(Y) is known at contract time, the optimal subsidy
formula is simple: let Q'(Y) =—G(Y).Then the subsidy exactly
cancels the monopsony term, —G(Y)/g(Y), and the firm is induced
to announce the efficient incremental wage, Y H.
In this special case, the piece rate approach to compensation
is feasible even though the worker cannot verify H. The tax or
penalty embodied in the quit pay is just enough to induce the
firmto set the right piece rate voluntarily.
In general, it will not be possible for the contract to
anticipatethe monopsony power of the firm.If the firm learns
somethingabout the state of the labor market after the contract
is signed but before setting the wage, then the relevant G(Y)
cannot be written into the contract. The distribution of A
conditional on information available at contract time is not the
relevant distribution; if the contract sets a subsidy based on
that distribution, it could turn out to be inefficiently high.
The subsidy is proportional to the probability of work. If the
probability was thought to be high at contract time for some
particular value of Y, and that Y turns out to be the optimal
one for the firm to choose, but then the actual probability of
work is low, the subsidy could be much too high. Inefficient
retentions cannot be avoided if new information becomes—35—
available to the firm.
Though coordinated severance pay cannot solve the separation
problem exactly except under highly unrealistic circumstances,
it does point to the desirability of a subsidy formula in the
firm—sets-wage contract. The firm always has some tnonopsony
power, so some degree of subsidy to the wage is desirable to
offset the power. In cases where unilateral wage determination
is the preferred solution, we would expect to find contract
provisions or implicit understandings that lower pay for work
will be accompanied by higher severance pay or other elements of
compensation not related to the amount of work.
Without going into the details, we note there exists a formula
relating layoff compensation to the wage announced by the worker
which induces the worker to reveal his true A the thereby bring
separation efficiency. The same defects attend this technique
as the symmetric one for employers just discussed.
Following is a brief summary of our conclusions about all the
contracts treated in the paper:
1. The fixed wage, firm-sets-wage, and worker-sets-wage
contracts are all feasible with respect to information, but fail
separation efficiency.
2. Piece rates, market wages, and the expectation principle
bring about separation efficiency, but require that both parties
possess information which in many cases is private to one side.
3. One—sided offer—matching eliminates inefficient quits,
while two-sided offer matching eliminates all inefficient—36—
separations. But offer-matching stimulates fraudulent offers.
4. The bilateral Vickrey contract bring about separation
efficiency, but places unreasonable informational requirements
on a third party, and invites collusion between the third party
and the worker or the firm.
5.Coordinatedseverance pay isbothfeasible and consistent
withseparation efficiency as long as the firm learns nothing
new about outside opportunities for the worker between the
framing of the contract and the setting of the wage.The
arrivalof new information will bring a violation of separation
efficiency.
Probably the most important message of this section is the
absence of a dominant contract. Even without risk aversion,
most arrangements fail to satisfy important criteria. In
particular, none of the contracts that achieve separation
efficiency cometo grips with bilateral limitations on
information.In our view, the information criterion comes first
in the ranking of contracts. The piece rate, market wage, and
expectations principle contracts are often infeasible from the
start because of the insuperable obstacles to direct measurement
of H and A to the satisfaction of both parties. Offer-matching
and the bilateral Vickrey contracts try to induce truthful
revelation, but they create opportunities for collusion that
render them impractical. Coordinated severance pay has the
opposite problem-—it fails when the firm has more information
than anticipated by the contract. Consequently, we reject all—37—
of the contracts that claim to achieve separationefficiency.
We conclude that excess layoffs and quits are anecessary
consequence of institutional arrangements which are the best
solution to informational inadequacies.—38—
VI. Other issues
A. Penalties for quits and layoffs
One of the extensions considered in section IV can be applied
to the simple fixed—wage contract considered earlier in the
paper, namely the provision of different penalties for a
separation depending on who initiates it. It may be possible to
improve the separation efficiency of a fixed-wage contract by
allowing L to differ from Q. The simple fixed—wage contract
brings inefficient separations, but never inefficient
retentions. With L different from Q, the two sources of
inefficiency can be traded off against one another.13 Consider
a contract which pays W if work occurs, Q if a quit occurs, and
L if a layoff occurs. The firm lays the worker off if M ( W —
L.The worker quits if A +Q> W. Figure I illustrates the
resulting situation. In the triangle ABC, inefficient work
occurs. A layoff should occur, but the firm is unwilling
because of the layoff penalty. The height of the triangle, AB,
is the essence of the argument of Green and Kahn (1981)
and Cooper (1981) that over—employment as well as
under—employment can occur under optimal second—best contracts.
Green and Kahn obtain the result under unilateral asymmetric
information and risk aversion. Cooper allows for bilateral
asymmetric information, but also emphasizes risk aversion.w
W-L
W- Q
Figure 4. Outcomes with quit pay Q and layoff pay L
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isL —Q,which is equal to its width, BC. What indexes the
tradeoff between inefficient retentions and inefficient
separations is not the level of either Q or L, but is the
difference between them.A tradeoff takes place only when the
layoff pay exceeds the quit pay.
Layoff pay in excess of quit pay creates adverse incentives.
The worker who finds A > W —Qcan do better if he can induce
the firm to lay him off rather than quitting; he will earn A +L
rther than A +Q.Similarly, when the firm discovers that it
would be profitable to lay a worker off, it would prefer that
the worker quit. The worker, finding a good opportunity in the
outside market, has an incentive to shirk in order to induce a
layoff. The firm, finding the worker redundant, has an
incentive to make his life miserable to induce him to quit. Or,
even if neither of these responses occurs, the worker and the
firm may reach a standoff, where both recognize that a
separation is timely but each hopes the other will go first;
this can happen anywhere in the northeast quadrant of figure 14•
Carmichael (1981) notes that this class of problems can be
circumvented by diverting layoff pay to a third party, so that
the firm faces incentives to limit layoffs, yet workers do not
have incentives to stimulate layoffs.
There are no similar obstacles to quit pay in excess of layoff
pay, but, as figure 5 shows, contracts of this type are perverse
with respect to separation efficiency. The shaded area ADEC of
inefficient separations can be eliminated by lowering Q to L
with no corresponding increase in other inefficiency. We—zo—
conclude that L will never be less than Q and will not be too
far above Q. Edward Lazear (1981b) shows that pension benefits
are sometimes higher for workers who retire at the firrns
request rather than at their own initiative, but these
differences are small.
B. Unilateral asymmetric information
When workers are risk—netural, it should be clear that
unilateral asymmetric information allows achievement of the
first—best allocation of labor.1 This well—known result is
worth restating in the present context.
If one side has all the relevant information, then it is
efficient to allow that side to determine the wage offer and to
allow the other side to decide on separation. For example, if
the firm knows both A and M, while the worker knows only A, the
firm should be given the right to select the wage, W. Because
the firm knows A, it will always offer A when M exceeds A and
zero otherwise. The worker will always work when W is at least
as high as A, so work occurs whenever H is at least as high as
A. This brings the efficient allocation of the worker's time.
The two parties can agree on a lump—sum component of
compensation to insure the desired distribution of profits and
utility.
1l4ee Hall and Lilien (1979), Grossman andHart (1981a), and
Green and Kahn (1981).C. Indexed contracts
If both parties to an employment contract observe a variable
that is correlated with A or M, it may be possible to improve
the performance of the fixed—wage contract. But the same
circumstances also favor the firm—sets—wage or the
worker—sets—wage contracts, so the role of indexing is
circumscribed. For example, consider an extreme case where the
unemployment rate conveys full information about A. A contract
with a wage indexed to the unemployment rate would provide full
separation efficiency, but so would a contract which assigns to
the firm the right to choose the wage.
The goal of indexation is to make the various provision of a
contract vary as conditions change so that employment and
separation take place in accord with the efficiency condition.
To keep the discussion simple, we will make the strong
assumption that compensation is exactly the same in the case of
a quit as in the case of a layoff. For the purposes of guiding
quits and layoffs, there is nothing to be gained by indexing
severance pay as well as the wage Itself, because both the
layoff and quit decisions depend only on the difference between
the wage and severance pay. Predetermined severance pay can be
combined with the lump—sum component of compensation, so W is
the amount of additional compensation paid in the case of' work,
and no additional compensation is paid in the case of' a
separation._L12..
Awage—indexing provision achieves separation efficiency if
and only if
A W Hwhenever A H
Nomatter what wage is set by the contract, a separation occurs
if' it is efficient. The trick is to prevent inefficient
separations by keeping the wage between A and H in those cases
where there is room between A and H.If' there are imperfect,
publicly known indicators of both A and H, the index formula
will give some weight to both, to minimize the probability of'
violating the efficiency condition.15
With respect to H, one natural indicator is the price of the
firm s product. In the nineteenth century, British coal miners
received wages indexed to the price of coal, in an arrangement
called the "sliding scale." We do not know of any contemporary
examples of indexation to product—specific price data.
Profit—sharing is a closely related type of' indexation, and is
widespread, especially in Japan. As a general matter,
indexation to indicators of H puts the responsibility for making
early discussion of optimal wage indexatlon, under somewhat
restrictive assumptions about the nature of' the employment
contract, appears in Jo Anna Gray (1976). More recently, David
Card (1981) has studied the nature of optimal indexing In a
multiperiod contract with bilaterally asymmetric information,
but ignores the issue of separation efficiency.—13—
separation decisions on the worker. Exact indexation to M,
which is the piecerate contract discussed earlier, makes the
firm completely indifferent about the level of employment.
With respect to A, indicators of conditions in local labor
markets are the natural choice. Private wage surveys and
government wage indexes appear to have an important role in the
wage—setting process, but we are unaware of any instances of
formal indexation to outside wage indexes. For the other
dimension of labor market conditions, the cost of finding new
work, indexation to measures of unemployment would appear to be
useful, but, again, we are unaware of any formal indexation of
this type.VII. Concluding remarks
No single contract has emerged from our study as a complete,
practical solution to the basic problem of deciding whether the
efficient use of a worker's time is at the firm or in the
outside market. We have discussed the virtues and defects of a
number of rules which set compensation so as to bring more or
less disirable unilateral decisions by firms and workers about
separations. Some of these rules are rejected at the outset for
requiring an impractical amount of information. Others are
rejected at the next stage for craeting serious adverse
incentives. One of the survivors brings full separation
efficiency under realistic assumptions about information.
With practical labor contracts, inefficient separations will
occur in a characteristic way. Layoffs and quits are
excessively sensitive to demand. In bad times, employers will
fail to take account of the poor opportunities available in the
outside market to laid-off workers. In good times, workers will
fail to take account of their own higher productivity in their
currentjobs when they contemplate quitting. Regrettable
layoffs when demand is weak and regrettable quits when strong is
the outcome of practical limitations on contracts.
We do not consider this feature of the labor market a failure
of free markets. Instead, it is an inevitable consequence of
imperfect information. Ourinvestigationsuggests that some
institutionsthat may seem arbitrary and even harmful——such asthe involuntary layoff--are actually ways the economy achieves a
second—best solution to the complex problem of allocating labor.References
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